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Executive Summary 
A Bus Rapid Transit (BRT) system is “a rubber-tired rapid transit service that combines 
stations, vehicles, running ways, a flexible operating plan, and technology”. It is often 
associated with high quality, customer-focused service that is frequent, fast, reliable, 
comfortable and cost-efficient. Implementing BRT systems in densely populated cities 
have been shown to have considerable benefits, including reduction of congestion, 
higher air quality, shorter travel times, appropriate transport for the poor, reduction of 
greenhouse gas emissions and higher-quality employment.  
 
This report illustrates the technology and economic value chain around BRT and gives 
insight in the benefits and challenges of bus rapid transit systems. The aim is to provide 
a background study to the CDKN Climate Technology & Development policy briefs on 
what technology policies could be pursued by local and international policymakers. BRT 
systems are relatively well-studied, so a lot of information could be found in literature.  
 
Of the almost 150 BRT systems in operation globally today, many are highly successful, 
the most famous example being Bogota’s TransMilenio system. However, not all BRT 
systems are successful. The most reported problems include resistance from the 
existing, informal public transportation operators or car owners, poor implementation 
as a result of underperforming local institutions, and overcrowding and resulting lower 
levels of comfort where BRT is in high demand. 
 
Several messages for policymakers can be distilled from this review. First, local 
circumstances matter tremendously and need to be studied well in order to make good 
decisions on routes, capacity, feeders, and type of BRT system. Transport service 
companies as well as local companies can provide this, although with the former the 
sensitivity for local circumstances remains a point of attention, while for the latter, 
capabilities and independence have sometimes shown to be problematic. 
 
Second, the political economy and public acceptance of BRT need to be taken into 
account early on: sizeable, successful BRT systems can damage incumbent transport 
providers. There are many ways to reduce resistance, including providing compensation 
for the incumbents in the form of training and re-employment of drivers of the old 
public transport systems for the BRT system. 
 
Third, BRT systems are always part of a broader transport system. Good and well-
managed links to other public and private transport means need to be planned. 
Moreover, ambassadors and advocates of BRT systems should avoid pitting BRT against 
other public transit systems, such as rail-based systems; they can enhance each other’s 
effectiveness and be complementary in an overall system. 
 
Lastly, even when the initiation of BRT systems is done successfully, the system needs 
maintenance, good financial management, and continued adjustment and resizing to 
deal with new circumstances. Proper institutional organisation lays at the basis of a BRT 
system that also functions in the longer run. 
 
The role of international policy support can be around dedicated public loans from 
multilateral development banks, raising awareness and funding for capability 
development and sharing of experiences between cities. The private sector could also 
do more to organise itself in an international business association that advocates 
responsible implementation of BRT systems. 
     5 
 
1 
Introduction 
Technology-oriented policies for low-carbon development pose questions that differ 
from market-based policies. Unlike market-based low-carbon policy, technology-
oriented policies are not oblivious to the technological implications; they imply a choice 
for a technology in a sector, excluding from that point onwards other options. Given 
that governments are not omniscient, this holds a risk of failure or a possibility that, in 
hindsight, the optimal solution is not implemented. But it also has advantages as 
resources can be focused and uncertainty for business can be reduced.  
 
Bus Rapid Transit systems are a public transport option that requires a public sector 
intervention, usually on the city level (Finn, 2012). BRT is “a rubber-tired rapid transit 
service that combines stations, vehicles, running ways, a flexible operating plan, and 
technology”. It is often associated with high quality, customer-focused service that is 
frequent, fast, reliable, comfortable and cost-efficient (Deng and Nelson, 2010).  
 
It is important to note there are many forms of public bus transport (see Figure 1). In 
developing countries, informal bus services are still very common (e.g., matatus in 
Kenya, see Graeff, 2010). Such services are characterized by low prices and high 
frequency, but also by low safety and comfort levels, low efficiency due to duplication 
of routes, old vehicles and poor conditions for workers on the buses. More advanced 
systems include organized, conventional bus services, but these are considered slow, 
often polluting and noisy, and uncomfortable. Dedicated, basic bus lanes, possibly for 
part of the route, improve on the safety and the speed. Enhanced services can include 
improved bus stops and more comfortable buses. Some combination of this is often 
called “BRT lite”. 
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Figure 1: Various levels of organization in bus transit systems (ITDP, 2007) 
 
A bus service can only be called Bus Rapid Transit when the bus drives on a dedicated 
bus lane that is often separated from other traffic, when the comfort level of buses is 
high, when the buses reach a relatively high average speed, and when there are 
dedicated and separately branded buses and bus terminals, with fare collection at the 
station rather than on the bus (this greatly enhances the speed of boarding and 
therefore the average speed of the bus service). A full BRT can mean that an entire city 
is connected by BRT, that feeder systems are in order (connections to other public 
transit methods, parking facilities for bicycles and cars, pedestrian access etc.), and that 
both express and regular services are provided on double lanes (so buses can overtake 
each other) (ITDP, 2007). 
 
In general, systems that are fast, safe and comfortable have the ability to convince 
people to shift their transport mode in the city from personal vehicles to public transit. 
This is where the value lies for low-carbon development: a well-developed rapid transit 
system, in particular in easily-congested, rapidly growing cities, can prevent the 
transition to a petrol-car-based transport system. Over the past decades, road 
transportation has been the fastest-growing source of greenhouse emissions (Bakker 
and Huizinga, 2010). 
 
This report is part of a larger project that aims to illuminate the considerations around 
technology options and policies, in particular on often-ignored political economy 
elements, to national and municipal policymakers, and to translate these to potential 
international technology interventions for negotiators in the UNFCCC climate talks. In 
this context, the aim of this report is to illustrate the technology and economic value 
chain around BRT and give insight in the benefits and challenges of bus rapid transit 
systems. The report is based on literature available in academic journals and online in 
policy documents and evaluations. A number of policy briefs, to be published
1
 based on 
the sequence of case studies, go into the lessons and potential contributions of 
international technology policies, such as through the Technology Mechanism.  
 
BRT systems are extensively documented in literature. Therefore, this report starts out 
with a review of existing BRT systems and their impacts in a number of cities in section 
2. Section 3 will unpack BRT systems in their various components to figure out what are 
xxxxxxxxxxxxssssssssxxxxxxxxxxxxxx 
1  See the project website on www.climatestrategies.org.  
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the components, who are suppliers, and what are the challenges. Section 4 will discuss 
the political economy, and interests of stakeholders, if BRT systems are implemented, 
and section 5, based on sections 3 and 4, will distil the main messages for policymakers. 
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2 
Development of Bus Rapid 
Transit systems 
2.1 Existing BRT systems developments 
According to BRTdata.org
2
, currently 147 BRT systems are operational, transporting 25 
million passengers per day and with a total length of 3851 km. The roots of BRT lay in 
the Americas. Before 1990, systems were operational in Brazil, mainly, in addition to 
several in Europe, Australia and North America. Most of these systems, however, were 
more like corridors and did not necessarily include the full service systems that we now 
call BRT. Following the huge success of such systems in Colombian cities (Bogota in 
particular), more cities followed. The past decade has seen an increase of BRT systems 
from about 35 in 2000 to the current 147. Latin American cities cover one third of all 
systems globally, and about 65% of all passengers transported. Over 80 cities are 
planning or constructing BRT systems. 2010 saw a peak of almost 20 additional cities 
opening BRT systems. 2011 and 2012 saw a significant slow-down. 
2.2 Reasons for BRT 
With the rise of BRT systems, many evaluation and review studies are conducted. Such 
studies reveal a large number of reasons to implement BRT systems (Rodriguez and 
Targa, 2004; Hensher and Gobb, 2008; ITP and IBIS, 2009; Kogdenko, 2011; Deng and 
Nelson, 2012): 
 Congestion reduction: The main reason for most BRT systems is the reduction of 
congestion and therefore the reduction of travel time for residents. For example, in 
Lagos, Nigeria (ITP and IBIS, 2009), this was quoted as one of the prime arguments 
for implementing the BRT system.  
xxxxxxxxxxxxssssssssxxxxxxxxxxxxxx 
2   A database of BRT systems maintained by a.o. WRI’s EMBARQ, the IEA Across Latitudes and Cultures - Bus Rapid 
Transit Centre of Excellence (ALC-BRT CoE). More information on www.brtdata.org.  
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 Increased road safety: In developed countries, public transport is less accident-
prone than private transport by car. In developing countries, the existing transport 
system through public mini-buses is often notorious for its lack of safety.  
 Travel convenience: Compared to minibuses or informal means of transportation, 
BRT systems are convenient. Compared to private car travel, BRT buses are 
considered less comfortable.  
 Revenues/costs ratio: In almost all cases, a public authority or public bank invests in 
the BRT system. Compared to other rapid mass transit systems, the investment 
costs are relatively low while the revenues can be comparable. An economic effect 
could be that land development has been found to increase as a consequence of 
BRT.  
 Lower cost overruns: Because of shorter implementation times compared to rail-
based mass transit systems, BRT systems have lower cost overruns.  
 Equity: Depending on the fare levels, BRT systems can provide a cheaper 
alternative to informal public transport or private vehicles. In Lagos, for instance, 
almost 60% of users reported that BRT was cheaper than their previous mode of 
transport, which for some 93% of the users was other public transport. Almost 20% 
indicated that the lower price was the main reason to use BRT (ITP and IBIS, 2009). 
Evaluation studies indicate that affordability is important for the success of the BRT 
system.  
 Creation of new job market: BRT systems can lead to higher-quality and more 
stable jobs than the informal public transport it replaces in developing countries. 
There is, however, no comparison of number of jobs between informal systems and 
BRT.  
 Reduction of local pollution (NOx, PM, CO, SO2): Transport is a major cause of air 
pollution, in particular in urban areas. Annual deaths presumably caused by air 
pollution globally ran into the hundreds of thousands in 2004 (Cohen et al., 2005). 
By reducing the use of private cars and using higher-quality buses than 
conventional buses, air pollution can be reduced. The Bogota TransMilenio system 
is reported to reduce pollution levels by 40% (Levinson et al, 2003). 
 Reduction of noise level in urban areas: Similar to reduction of local air pollution.  
 Contribution to CO2 reduction: If the BRT system replaces car or minibus travel, it 
can reduce emissions. However, when BRT replaces travel by foot or bicycle, the 
reduction in CO2 emissions may be limited. An overall assessment of reduction of 
CO2 emissions by BRT could not be found.  
The proportion of the population using BRT systems is negatively correlated with GDP 
per capita, as countries with lower per capita incomes generally (but not always) have 
lower car ownership and higher demand for public transit (Hensher and Li, 2012). From 
this, one can conclude that BRT may contribute to preventing that car ownership and 
use rises quickly in low-income countries as individual incomes start rising. In addition, 
it is established that well-implemented BRT systems in densely populated megacities 
can result in people using BRT rather than their cars (Deng and Nelson, 2010). 
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2.3 Comparison of BRT to other options 
BRT seems to be an appropriate solution for problems related to increasing air pollution 
and excessive travel times in urban areas, in particular in rapidly developing cities. Its 
impact on congestion is not always unambiguous, however, as the running ways of BRT 
systems generally take lanes away from car traffic, leading to more congestion in the 
remaining lanes, while at the same time reducing congestion by offering car, bus and 
minibus users an alternative. It needs to have sufficient critical mass and capacity to 
make a difference for congestion. 
 
BRT also has potential to reduce greenhouse gas emissions. Investment costs and lead 
times are lower than for other rapid transit systems, in particular compared to metro. 
Metro might still be the preferred option if the city is particularly densely built up, and 
the street width does not allow for the inclusion of a dedicated bus lane. Elevated light 
rail systems are generally still faster and more comfortable, but also less flexible and 
more expensive.  
 
Table 1 clearly shows the dilemma for decision-makers between different mass transit 
options: whether to implement the capital-intensive and expensive option of a metro, 
that can reach high capacities and speeds, and has low impacts aboveground, or 
whether to implement an option like BRT that has lower capacities and speeds, and 
costs considerable space aboveground, but has much shorter lead times, lower costs 
and more flexibility. It will depend on the context of the city what is feasible. Historic 
city centres often have narrow roads, making a BRT much more costly and less 
acceptable, as historic buildings would need to be torn down. For such a situation, a 
metro might be the only way. In cities with high car ownership and relatively low 
congestion problems, BRT might not be economically feasible. But in cities with much 
sprawl and wider roads, high population densities and large groups who cannot afford a 
car, BRT might be the more affordable option. 
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Table 1: Comparison of mass transit options (table taken from Deng and Nelson, 2011). (Minimum 
headway means how much time has to be allowed between vehicles.) 
 
2.4 Effectiveness of BRT 
Studies have evaluated BRT systems for effectiveness in various places. Studying the 
ultimate aim of BRT – to entice people who would have otherwise used a car to use 
public transit – means conducting extensive surveys and evaluating the counterfactual.  
Hensher and Li (2012) applied regression to 46 urban BRT systems all over the world to 
establish variations in ridership across different systems. From this, they derived the 
statistically significant factors that contributed to the ridership change drivers. Their 
results indicate clearly that what seem like details in the implementation of BRT 
systems can make a difference in the effectiveness of the system. Factors such as 
capacity and length of the BRT network, frequency during rush hour, pre-board fare 
collection and verification and average distance between stations (less is better) matter 
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significantly. Institutional factors are also important: the presence of “quality control 
oversight from an independent entity/agency” would increase ridership compared to 
systems where such control is not present or not implemented well. Systems that have 
been in operation for longer, in particularly those in Latin America, have higher 
numbers of ridership. Connections also matter: within the BRT system but also with 
other public and private transport modes. Hensher and Li (2012) also find that the fare 
matters and that there is a considerable price elasticity.  
 
Kogdenko (2011) evaluated the Beijing, Jakarta and Delhi BRT systems on their 
contribution to sustainable development. This contribution was evaluated on criteria 
around environment, economy and social factors. She found that although all three 
systems improved the transport situations in the three cities in terms of bus transfer 
times and road safety, they are not necessarily functioning in an optimal way. Beijing 
performed best. The main cause was insufficient capacity leading to overcrowding, 
lower comfort and slower travel times. Deng and Nelson (2012) also evaluated the 
Beijing BRT positively.  
 
Various recommendations have been made by these and other evaluation studies. Main 
recommendations included that future BRTs should use the latest transport planning 
details; when this is not done, they are not likely to meet the capacity demand. Political 
support is also essential (ITB and IBIS, 2009; Kogdenko, 2011), in addition to a (public) 
body that can act as the BRT system’s owner (see next chapter). Some studies 
mentioned a stakeholder engagement programme to make sure that transport 
organisations were in agreement and customer needs were met (Graeff, 2010; ITB and 
IBIS, 2009). The integration of the BRT system with feeder systems was also regarded as 
a critical success factor (Kogdenko, 2011; Hensher and Li, 2012). 
2.5 The potential of BRT 
Although BRT is implemented in an increasing number of cities, its potential is by no 
means depleted. However, it is not easy to establish the greenhouse gas emissions it 
might potentially reduce, as the internally consistent energy systems models commonly 
used to project what happens to global energy systems and CO2 emissions are more 
based on technologies, which can be modelled against a technological cost, and less on 
systemic and behavioural change.  
 
However, some estimates can be made. More than 80% of the people in the world do 
not own a car (IEA, 2012) and more than 50% of the global population is now living in 
cities (UN, 2012). The IEA projects that “BRT can contribute substantially to global CO2 
savings, potentially up to 0.5 GtCO2 cumulative in the 2010 to 2050 time frame” (IEA, 
2012). For this, BRT would have to be widely implemented, although the 
documentation does not reveal how many cities would implement BRT for such 
reduction numbers (IEA models run on regional, not urban, level).  
 
Although the recent fast rise of BRT systems seems to have slumped considerably in 
2011 and 2012, the potential for growth is still large. No information could be found, on 
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BRTdata.org or elsewhere, to explain the slump. Knowing that could however provide 
interesting information on how the BRT system concept could be applied in other 
places. Examples in Europe and Canada demonstrate that BRT can also be useful for 
larger, less densely populated, areas as an alternative to trains, although in such cases 
the function as a feeder to other transport modes, such as trains or metro, could 
become more important (Rambaud et al., 2008). 
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3 
Systematic discussion of Bus 
Rapid Transit systems 
BRT systems seem simple, but have a number of components that clarify that a 
considerable organization and economy can emerge around them. This section first 
explains the technological components of BRT systems, then the organisation of BRT 
systems and subsequently lists the private-sector suppliers of technology, knowledge 
and services. 
3.1 Value chain analysis 
For US-based BRT systems, Duke University has conducted a thorough analysis of the 
value chain and is keeping an online database of companies and public sector 
organisations supplying parts of that value chain. From their work, it can be concluded 
that in the United States, BRT systems are initiated and often (co-)financed through 
public-sector sources, but largely or fully implemented by the private sector. The value 
associated with BRT systems along the chain varies greatly with the circumstances and 
the size of the system, but generally, in the United States, amounts to up to a hundred 
million US dollar in capital investment (Lowe and La, 2012). The business model of BRT 
systems is that these investments are recuperated through ticket sales and smaller 
services, such as advertising in buses and on stations. Figure 2 schematically represents 
the value chain of BRT systems in the United States. 
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Figure 2: Value chain of BRT systems in the United States. The authors identify public sector 
involvement fully in financing through public sources, and partly in investors, communications, 
maintenance, safety/security and operations. Further explanation of the terms used in this figure can 
be found in the next sections (source: Duke, 2013). 
 
3.2 Technology components 
The technological and knowledge components of a BRT system are well-documented in 
the literature (Deng and Nelson, 2011; Finn, 2012). Hardware components are (see also 
figure 2): 
1. Running ways (corridors): In many cities, 2 to 4 dedicated lanes in a street have to 
be cleared and refurbished for a BRT corridor or system.  
2. Vehicles and fuel: Generally, the buses used are high-capacity buses of 150 or more 
passengers, running on diesel, sometimes articulated (split in two or even three 
independently moving parts). In the case of buses running on cleaner gas, the fuel 
supply might also be done by a specialised company (Lowe and La, 2012).  
3. Stations: the bus terminals or stations vary greatly, from simple stops with a roof 
and one wall to dedicated buildings with fare collection systems and even small 
shops.  
4. Feeder systems (connections to other transport modes): a BRT system depends 
heavily on how it is connected to other transport modes, as the travel from a bus 
terminal to another is generally only part of the journey. Depending on the context, 
pedestrian access, bicycle parking, connection to train, parking facilities etc. are 
critical.  
5. Fare collection: The most successful BRT systems feature pre-journey fare 
collection systems. This distinguishes BRT from regular bus services, which usually 
collect fares at the driver, delaying the departure of the bus until all passengers 
have made their payments.  
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Figure 3: Visualisation of hardware components of a BRT system, in this case of the Quito Ecovía line 
(Photo by Lloyd Wright; source of photo: Wright and Hook, 2007). 
 
 
In general, the hardware does not pose the greatest problems to BRT systems, as the 
separate technologies are well known. The “soft” part of technology is at least as 
important and usually more challenging to coordinate, although by now there are 
various private-sector actors that can provide a package of services. The supporting 
services and consultancy around BRT consist of: 
 Route structure and capacity planning: The intellectual labour of obtaining data on 
transportation demand, traffic streams, and based on that planning a route 
structure for a city.  
 Services and operations: all aspects related to Information services for customers, 
cleaning and maintenance of the stations, drivers and conductors, etc.  
 Intelligent Transportation Systems (ITS): ITS have been reported to improve 
operational efficiency of BRT systems considerably, such as in Beijing, for instance 
by reducing delay at intersections and increasing passenger boarding speed 
through electronic ticketing (Deng and Nelson, 2012).  
Marketing and branding: many BRT systems have a distinct name and brand (e.g., the 
TransMilenio in Bogota, TransJakarta in Jakarta etc). It is essential for customer trust 
that the brand name is seen favourably. 
3.3 Organisation of BRT 
It has been noted before that the organization of BRT systems is probably one of its 
greater challenges in developing countries. Some authors have recommended better 
exchange of experiences (Graeff, 2010), something that seems to have contributed to 
the diffusion of BRT in Latin America (see the activities of the ALC-BRT-CoE – 
www.brt.cl). 
 
Finn (2012) gives a detailed account and summary of how BRT systems are organized. 
He notes that in all cases, BRT systems require new collaborations between public and 
private partners. The relations between them need to be established, and this takes 
time. There are different ways to distribute tasks in a BRT system, but he distinguishes 
three clear operational roles:  
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1) the BRT system owner, which is always a public entity. Often it is the transport 
authority in the city or region, or a specifically formed subsidiary of a transport 
authority. The system owner is generally owned by the municipality. It makes policy and 
strategic decisions about the reach and size, nature, tariff structure and economic 
conditions of the system, and selects the operator of the other functions. It can also 
pose additional demands and boundary conditions for private operators, such as the re-
employment of former informal public transport providers. 
 
2) the BRT system manager manages the bus operations, terminals, running ways, 
services and marketing, and quality control. These functions can be contracted to 
separate companies again, but in general the management works best if it is in one 
place. The BRT system manager can be part of the transportation authority, an existing 
transport systems operator or a special-purpose entity under the transportation 
authority. Finn (2012) notes that the system management can be an organization of its 
own with potentially up to 500 employees, excluding bus drivers and conductors.  
 
3) the BRT assets manager: conducts the daily service and maintains the assets, such as 
running ways, stations, fee-collection etc. This is most likely to be a private company 
but it can also be done by a public company or a public-private partnership. Multiple 
asset managers can operate on a single BRT system; for instance, the acclaimed Bogota 
TransMilenio system is currently operated by seven companies (Veolia website, 2013). 
 
Although companies offer the full package of the services listed in the previous 
paragraph (basically everything except the buses themselves), and can act as BRT 
system manager as well as assets manager, it is necessary that a public transit authority 
(the system owner) maintains a significant level of knowledge about the system. A 
private company may have an interest in higher prices in order to increase profit 
margins, even when it is not necessary, or purchasing lower-quality buses. The public 
authority should represent the public interest in a credible way but should also make 
sure it has independent information to rely on for decisions. Therefore, there is an 
argument for separating the contract for system manager and the asset manager.  
 
In terms of policy or incentives, successful BRT systems can be implemented without 
subsidies as costs can be recuperated through fares. Many do make use of public 
investment funds, such as a national public bank or a multilateral bank. The early 
phases of TransMilenio, for instance, were financed through a World Bank loan but run 
without subsidies otherwise (ITBP, 2007). Some authors argue that the involvement of 
international financiers is also beneficial for knowledge transfer, in knowing how to 
organise and contract out operation of a BRT, and should therefore be an essential 
element of financing when a city embarks on a BRT system for the first time (Kogdenko, 
2011). 
3.4 Private sector suppliers 
There are various suppliers of both hard and soft technology for a BRT system. The 
corridors are most likely constructed through local companies in the road construction 
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sector, although BRT is generally relatively straightforward in this respect, as existing 
roads are usually upgraded, separated and marked. It would lead to temporary local 
employment. The buses are provided by bus companies that have specialised in BRT 
buses. Examples are Marcopolo, a Colombian-Brazilian company which provides buses 
for example in Bogota and Johannesburg, Mercedes, Volvo and Scania. As a single 
sizeable BRT system can operate hundreds of buses, providing buses for a BRT system 
can be an attractive order.  
 
System and asset managers can be various companies, such as Veolia Transportation, 
URS corporation and other transport providers. Some of them provide services along 
the entire value chain, while others specialise in specific services. It goes too far to 
discuss all companies that provide services; in the United States alone there are 
hundreds that benefit from the BRT value chain (Lowe and La, 2012). 
3.5 Innovation aspects of BRT 
Expansion of an operational BRT system to new corridors, more stations or more 
intensive use by buses means that the concept is known with customers (and 
presumably well-used), the institutions are in place and have gained experience and the 
hardware has been tested in the local context. In that sense, this would qualify as 
diffusion of the technology and not find great challenges, if the existing system has 
been functioning well.  
 
From an innovation perspective, however, every city that implements its first BRT 
system is demonstrating a technology in a new environment. Every city is different in 
terms of size, density and built environment, and every city’s inhabitants have different 
habits and preferences, are in different economic circumstances, and have different 
travel needs. Some studies have given the appropriateness of BRT for different urban 
environments, in terms of population density, existing transport system and level of 
development.  
 
Blanco et al. (2012: Figure 1) highlight different roles of different actors in the 
technological innovation system for different phases of technological diffusion. Treating 
BRT systems as a group of technologies and practices that is in the demonstration 
phase, the following roles can be identified around a new BRT system: 
 Government can raise awareness among customers, fund data collection and 
interpretation and provide loans for the investment around BRT systems. Politicians 
(rather than policymakers) play an important role to raise awareness, interest and 
support for BRT in their constituencies. In addition, policymakers can enable BRT 
through urban and spatial planning, linking BRT with other means of transport 
(feeding) and discourage car ownership and use.  
 The financial sector can provide loans in addition to purely public loans. In 
particular development banks have played an important catalysing role for BRT 
systems in developing countries.  
 The private sector’s role around BRT is to supply most elements in the value chain 
of BRT, as well as innovate towards improved and more cost-effective solutions. 
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However, the private sector is generally not well-organised around services of BRT 
systems (Lowe and La, 2012) and companies that also have rail transit services in 
their portfolio may prefer selling those as they are generally more capital-intensive 
and could allow for a higher value-added.  
 Users of BRT systems are the ultimate test for the new BRT system in practice. A 
barrier can be that those not benefiting from BRT (the car-users whose roads are 
narrowed by the implementation of BRT) are in some cases more influential and 
better organised than the users of the system (as has been noted around the BRT 
system in Delhi, see Padmanabhan, 2012). Users can also use their vote to reward 
the politician who championed the system. 
The cases of successful BRT systems have often seen a fruitful collaboration between 
(multilateral) development banks and a visionary public sector ambassador (often a 
mayor). 
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4 
Political economy of Bus 
Rapid Transit systems 
The political economy of BRT systems is not extensively studied as such, but has come 
up on several occasions. Here, two cases of documented examples can be given of how 
the interests of different stakeholders lead to conflict around BRT systems: the BRT 
corridor in Delhi and BRT initiatives in African cities.  
 
In Delhi, India, the BRT corridor has led to vehement protests by car owners as the 
system removes part of the road available to cars, the vehicle of choice for inhabitants 
of Delhi who can afford it. There is some reason for criticism of the BRT implementation 
in Delhi: because of low institutional capability, outdated data and low involvement of 
international experience, the system did not perform as well as it could have 
(Kogdenko, 2011). However, there is more at stake than just factual assessment of the 
system performance.  
 
An article by Anil Padmanabhan
3
 discusses recent developments as follows: “The *BRT+ 
experiment highlighted the political economy of transport. That is, how do you divvy up 
road space among all users: should it be [sic] on the equity principle that will logically 
maximize public good or should it favour private vehicle owners?” He goes on and 
concludes that a court decision in favour of BRT made the right decision, as by far most 
of the funds for infrastructure are spent on facilitating car travel anyhow, while 
proportionally fewer people make use of them. He rejects the economic argument that 
the time of car owners is worth more than those of public-transit users on equity 
reasons. Nevertheless, among many well-to-do in Delhi, the BRT systems are pitched as 
a nuisance and a waste of public money. Negative media attention is said to have 
contributed greatly to this negative image (Kogdenko, 2011). In the Delhi case, the 
political economy around BRT systems has contributed to a poorer performance.  
 
In various African cities, BRT systems are considered or in operation. Implementation in 
Johannesburg (South Africa) and Lagos (Nigeria) has so far been conducted relatively 
xxxxxxxxxxxxssssssssxxxxxxxxxxxxxx 
3  Information based on opinion article by Anil Padmanabhan: 
http://www.livemint.com/Opinion/bmP5xMHAdlTr8ZYblx2GJM/Delhi-HC-bats-for-public-good.html?facet=print.  
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successfully, although the introduction of mass transit in general (also rail services in 
Johannesburg) has led to visible and extensive protests by taxi drivers. Nairobi is an 
example of a city where in particular the informal matatu service industry would be hurt 
by the entry of a BRT system. Matatu is the local word for minibuses that seat 14 people 
and drive on routes that are not planned but emerge according to customer demand. 
Graeff (2010) describes matatu form of public transit as “dangerous, profit-driven, 
environmentally unfriendly but also necessary to be mobile and maintain a daily routine 
of going to work, to school or to market. Simply stated, [the matatu industry] provides a 
necessary service to millions of people who will continue to use it as needed to be 
mobile.” So the functionality of the incumbent transit system should not be 
underestimated, but there is a lot of room for improvement.  
 
Graeff describes the matatu industry as “organised chaos”, in the sense that it self-
organises quite successfully in many respects but does not fulfil public needs 
sufficiently. The list of problems mentioned by interviewees around the public transit 
situation in Nairobi is long: lack of political will and a political champion, poor driving 
behaviour of matatu-drivers, safety for customers as matatus are increasingly stuck in 
traffic jams, job security for matatu crews and support staff, police bribes, poor data 
and information about transport demand, traffic flows and the matatu industry. Graeff 
indicates that BRT, in the context of the remainder of the transit system, can provide 
solutions to many of these problems, but warns against top-down implementation 
without raising support with users, politicians and matatu operators. She recommends 
including the existing transit providers in the decision-making process around BRT in 
order to bring their knowledge, experiences and wishes to the table. 
 
These examples, as well as the value-chain discussion in chapter 3, lead to an overview 
of the possible interests of different actors around the BRT system: 
 Public transit commuters: In general, public transit commuters are content with 
BRT systems as they provide more comfort and are faster than informal or normal 
bus public transit systems.  
 Car users: Initially, resistance may arise as roads get narrower to make space for 
BRT corridors, stations and feeder systems, including in some cases pedestrian and 
bicycle lanes. In the longer run, if BRT functions so well that car use is reduced, the 
effect may be beneficial as other traffic pressure is reduced, although that in turn 
may lead to higher car use again as the attractiveness is increased.  
 When the BRT system is successful, all inhabitants of a city benefit from higher 
quality of life, a healthier environment and better public transit services. For people 
living along routes, BRT systems are documented to lead to more economic activity 
and in some cases increased value of property. Moreover, businesses along the 
route and near stations seem to benefit, although it is unclear whether the effect is 
as large for BRT as for metro or light rail.  
 For workers in the public transit sector, a switch to a BRT system can mean the loss 
of employment. However for those that manage to switch jobs to the BRT 
company, the quality of work and pay of employment generally increases. Several 
BRT projects in cities have deliberately started programmes for re-educating and 
employing drivers and other personnel of the incumbent transit system in the new 
BRT system.  
 Company operating the system, supplying buses and other services: Obviously, 
private-sector suppliers to BRT systems benefit from greater turnover. However, 
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some that provide full-value chain services also supply services around competing 
technologies and systems, such as light rail or metro systems. Given higher 
investment costs around these systems, such companies might advocate other 
transit solutions over the more cost-effective BRT. 
 Politicians: the politician who is the champion of a successful BRT system gains 
political influence; the mayor of Bogota became a bit of a global celebrity because 
of the system he championed in his city. However, in many places, interests of the 
incumbent, formal or informal public-transit systems are aligned with interests of 
politicians, who sometimes co-own private bus companies. In such cases of 
conflicting interests, the politicians stand to lose influence and income because of 
BRT systems and may resist. The politician also has to firmly believe that taking 
away road space from cars will deliver the projected benefits. 
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5 
Messages for policymakers 
Depending on the city environment, BRT systems can make a significant contribution to 
improved urban living, shorter travel times and greenhouse gas emission reductions. In 
addition, it has significant turnover; a single BRT system can lead to tens of millions of 
USD in investments and higher-quality employment, although it can also lead to lower 
employment in any informal public transport systems it may replace. 
 
BRT is a mature technology but its application and fit with local circumstances depend 
heavily on context, which makes it less mature in areas where it is not yet implemented. 
In particular, organisational issues and resistance from the incumbent transport system 
can be show-stoppers when BRT is initiated. Overcrowding (resulting from poor 
planning but great use) as well as faulty financial management or maintenance can be 
challenges later on.  
 
Deciding on a BRT system as opposed to maintaining the status quo or introducing 
another mass transit system, as well as agreeing on how the system is implemented, 
requires a number of aspects to be taken into account by national and local 
policymakers and politicians: 
 BRT can be a threat to existing public or private transportation systems, which in 
developing countries are often informal and privately-owned but comprising a 
significant work force. Policymakers however can also make use of the 
dissatisfaction and large social disadvantages of the existing system (worker job 
security, quality of work, commuter safety and comfort, road safety, aside from air 
quality and other environmental reasons). Resistance can be taken away by 
offering employment to drivers and off-board personnel in the new BRT system. 
Moreover, BRT can be associated with a positive image and pride around the city. 
 BRT should always be seen as part of a transit system. It is not a 100% solution and 
should be used appropriately in its context. In cities with low-density housing and 
high car ownership, like in the US, it needs to connect well with car-based feeding 
and provide for safe and affordable parking space. In other places, bicycle 
connections, connections with informal public transit, railways or with pedestrian-
based neighbourhoods can be more important. 
 The private sector has a significant role in BRT systems. What can be done to 
facilitate them to play a more constructive role? Suggestions have been made to 
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form business constituencies to lobby for more BRT systems. However, a 
consideration could be that private sector interests may lie in systems that are less 
cost-effective for the public purse but provide higher value-added to business 
stakeholders.  
 The TransMilenio experience shows that BRT systems, especially in densely-
populated larger cities with low car ownership, need to be scaled to handle large 
crowds. TransMilenio is so well-used that it is losing popular support because of 
overcrowding. 
 In general, BRT supporters should avoid pitting (public) transit means against each 
other, acknowledging that in many contexts, every transport mode has a role to 
play. In practice, however, some companies might prefer higher-value transit 
modes over BRT.  
What international interventions could be helpful around BRT systems, taking into 
account the national context and private sector role?  
 The local public sector generally initiates a BRT system. Cities can learn from other 
cities. The experiences in Bogota’s TransMilenio project were shared widely; many 
other urban planners visited Bogota to learn. Cities considering BRT are 
recommended to conduct site visits and find other ways of learning from other 
cities with a similar context to see how they set up their BRT systems, planned 
capacity and dealt with resistance. This could be facilitated by international 
funders. 
 Several papers indicated that financing by multilateral development banks (MDBs) 
was a helpful start for BRT. Such MDBs could make cities more aware of the 
possibilities of BRT and could develop specialised loan services for BRT systems. 
 International business organisations could organise private sector suppliers on an 
international level to implement more and more extensive BRT systems.  
In conclusion, it seems that the TransMilenio project has been tremendously important 
for the deployment of the almost 150 BRT systems currently in place, as it showed that 
BRT systems can deliver high-capacity and high-efficiency public transit while at the 
same time greatly improving quality of life in a city where transportation problems were 
mounting. The question to international policymakers is what combination of 
strategies, consisting of a combination of capability, technology and organisational 
elements, can make BRT an even more wide-spread transit mode that serves the rising 
middle class in practically every appropriate provincial town in fast-industrialising areas 
of the world. 
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